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THE CALIFORNIA GREENHOUSE GAS 
WAIVER DECISION AND AGENCY 
INTERPRETATION: A RESPONSE TO 
PROFESSORS GALLE AND SEIDENFELD 
NINA A. MENDELSON† 
INTRODUCTION 
Professors Brian Galle and Mark Seidenfeld add some important 
strands to the debate on agency preemption, particularly in their 
detailed documentation of the potential advantages agencies may 
possess in deliberating on preemption compared with Congress and 
the courts.1 As they note,2 the quality of agency deliberation matters 
to two different debates. First, should an agency interpretation of 
statutory language to preempt state law receive Chevron deference in 
the courts, as other agency interpretations may, or should some lesser 
form of deference be given? Second, should a general statutory 
authorization to an agency to administer a program and to issue rules 
be read broadly to include the authority to declare state law 
preempted if the agency views that as an appropriate way to 
implement the program? (I have previously argued for both limited 
deference and a presumption against agency preemption.3) 
 
Copyright © 2008 by Nina A. Mendelson. Noncommercial copying of this work is licensed 
under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial License, as long as the licensee 
notes the author’s name, title, and that the work was first published in the Duke Law Journal. 
To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0 or send a letter 
to Creative Commons, 171 Second St., Suite 300, San Francisco, CA 94105 USA. 
 † Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. I am grateful to the other 
symposium participants, Professors Stuart Benjamin, Brian Galle, Gillian Metzger, Mark 
Seidenfeld, and Ernest Young, for a lively and helpful discussion of the issues, and to the Duke 
Law Journal for the opportunity to participate in the Symposium. 
 1. Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism: Preemption, 
Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933, 1948–85 (2008). 
 2. See id. at 1943. 
 3. See Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 797–98 
(2004) [hereinafter Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption]; Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption 
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Galle and Seidenfeld argue for the superiority of agency 
decisionmaking because, as a formal matter, it may be comparatively 
transparent and accountable.4 An agency, unlike Congress, must 
comply with notice and comment requirements, at least for 
rulemaking, and must explain its reasons for taking an action on 
judicial review.5 Galle and Seidenfeld suggest that agency preemption 
decisions might be even better reasoned if the judiciary engaged in a 
harder “hard look” on judicial review.6 As a preliminary matter, I 
want to point out that the level of agreement among commentators 
writing in this area is striking. Professors Galle, Seidenfeld, Catherine 
Sharkey, Thomas Merrill, and I all agree that agencies should not be 
categorically prohibited from preempting state law.7 We agree further 
that agencies have valuable information to offer about how a 
particular federal program functions, the issues it is designed to 
address, and how regulated entities may fare if faced with multiple 
standards.8 Finally, however—and despite Galle and Seidenfeld’s 
claims on behalf of agency decisionmaking—we apparently also agree 
that more controls are needed on agency interpretations that preempt 
state law than can be provided by the Chevron9 doctrine alone.10 
Under that doctrine, courts uphold a “reasonable” agency 
 
Against Agency Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 695, 706–24 (2008) [hereinafter Mendelson, 
Presumption]. 
 4. Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 1949–61 (transparency); id. at 1979–85 
(accountability). 
 5. Id. at 1956. 
 6. Id. at 2001–02. The judicial “hard look” refers to review applying the Administrative 
Procedure Act’s “arbitrary and capricious” review standard. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006) 
(requiring courts to set aside agency actions, findings, and conclusions if courts find them to be 
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”). 
 7. Professor Merrill has opposed Chevron deference in his amicus brief filed in Watters v. 
Wachovia. Brief of the Center for State Enforcement of Antitrust and Consumer Protection 
Laws, Inc. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 6–8, 16–19, Watters v. Wachovia Bank, 
N.A. 127 S. Ct. 1559 (2006) (No. 05-1342), 2006 WL 2570991. He argues, however, that an 
agency could properly receive a delegation to preempt state law if Congress expressly 
authorized the agency to do so. Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 
NW. U. L. REV. 727, 767 (2008). Professor Sharkey has advocated Skidmore deference in her 
piece, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449, 
492–93 (2008). 
 8. See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 1971–74; Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and 
Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 755–56 (2008); Sharkey, supra note 7, at 485–90. 
 9. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984). 
 10. See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 1999 (“We doubt Chevron is flexible enough to 
capture all the nuances of our test.”); Merrill, supra note 8, at 775 (arguing for Skidmore rather 
than Chevron deference); Sharkey, supra note 7, at 491–98 (same). 
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interpretation of ambiguous statutory language.11 No one wants to 
give away the store here. 
Professor Sharkey and I both recommend a Skidmore deference 
standard for agency preemption decisions (and I also advocate for a 
presumption against reading a statute to grant an agency the power to 
preempt state law).12 Under the Skidmore standard, agency 
interpretations receive a measure of deference, but one weaker than 
Chevron deference, that depends on whether the court finds the 
agency’s reasoning persuasive.13 Despite their lengthy defense of 
agency preemption processes, Professors Galle and Seidenfeld 
ultimately take only a modified version of this position, because they 
advocate enhanced judicial review of agency reasoning on state law 
preemption that bears a strong resemblance to the sort of review 
courts conduct using Skidmore.14 
So, at least about the bottom line, we do not disagree about very 
much. Yet, given the arguments they make, why do Professors Galle 
and Seidenfeld hesitate as much as they do about deferring even 
more to agencies? Their hesitation stems, I suggest, from the fact that 
even good procedures and judicial review may not be sufficient for 
agencies to properly consider the range of issues, including federalism 
values, that should be part of a state law preemption decision. A 2008 
agency decision on preemption is an excellent case in point—the 
EPA’s interpretation of Clean Air Act Section 209(a) in its decision 
finding California preempted from regulating automobile greenhouse 
gas emissions.15 The EPA’s interpretation of statutory language on 
preemption failed to consider important relevant issues. These issues, 
 
 11. Chevron, 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984). 
 12. See Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, supra note 3, at 797–98; Sharkey, supra note 
7, at 492–93. 
 13. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (holding that an agency 
interpretation may receive deference depending upon the “thoroughness evident in its 
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later 
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade”). 
 14. They advocate “an amalgam of Skidmore and hard-look review.” See Galle & 
Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 2001–02. Their only apparent hesitation about Skidmore review is 
that because of the doctrine of stare decisis, it seems to limit an agency’s flexibility to change its 
mind. Id. at 2000–01; see also, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 247 (2001) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting) (arguing that a Skidmore approach will lead to “ossification” of statutory law). 
On the other hand, this seems to present the greatest problem when the Supreme Court has 
spoken. For example, a court of appeals may revisit precedent or disagree with another 
appellate court. Moreover, an agency can seek a legislative amendment from Congress. 
 15. See discussion infra Part II. 
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which Galle and Seidenfeld term “abstract federalism,”16 include the 
extent to which preservation of state autonomy can lead to more 
national dialogue and experimentation on policies and 
counterbalance federal authority. 
What explains this? In my view, the ability of agencies to 
deliberate on preemption suffers from distinctive limitations that 
Galle and Seidenfeld do not adequately consider. I discuss two such 
shortcomings. First, as I have elsewhere argued, agencies lack 
expertise in federalism values that can figure in state law preemption 
questions. As with the EPA’s decision on the California greenhouse 
gas regulations, agencies show a consistent unwillingness to take these 
issues into account. 
Second, a federal agency with a policy in hand would seem 
comparatively unlikely to concede the need for further 
experimentation or policy development by other governments. 
Professors Galle and Seidenfeld argue that enhanced judicial review 
might prompt better analysis of these issues. Under current law, 
however, judicial review of agency decisionmaking may have the 
contrary incentive, instead deterring agencies from considering 
abstract federalism concerns. Accordingly, judges should not 
presumptively defer to agency decisions in this area. 
THE EPA’S DECISION ON CALIFORNIA  
AUTOMOBILE GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 
The authority to set emissions standards for automobiles is 
primarily federal, and states are generally preempted from setting 
their own tailpipe standards.17 By statute, however, preemption of 
state law is not complete. Under Clean Air Act Section 209(b), the 
EPA administrator “shall” grant a waiver of preemption to California 
for state standards that are at least as protective of public health and 
welfare as the federal standards.18 The section provides three 
exceptions that might justify a waiver denial.19 Most importantly, the 
administrator must deny a waiver of preemption if the administrator 
finds that “such State does not need such State standards to meet 
 
 16. Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 2012. 
 17.  42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2000) (“No State or any political subdivision thereof shall adopt 
or attempt to enforce any standard relating to the control of emissions from new motor 
vehicles . . . .”) (this section is commonly referred to as Clean Air Act § 209(a)). 
 18. Id. § 7543(b). 
 19. Id. 
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compelling and extraordinary conditions.”20 The EPA has considered 
over fifty waiver applications and apparently has granted most, if not 
all, to date.21 
California’s leadership in regulating automotive air pollution is 
well recognized. According to the Congressional Research Service, 
California’s regulation has served to demonstrate “cutting edge 
emission control technologies,” including, among other things, 
catalytic converters and cleaner fuels.22 
In response to global warming concerns, California’s legislature 
mandated the first-ever greenhouse gas standards for automobiles in 
2002; regulations were promulgated in 2004, and California filed a 
petition for waiver of preemption with the EPA on December 21, 
2005.23 The Clean Air Act permits other states to elect to follow 
California standards in lieu of federal standards,24 and sixteen states 
have indicated their intent to adopt the California greenhouse gas 
standards.25  
The EPA took two full years to decide the petition.26 Keeping a 
commitment to California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger that it 
would render a decision by the end of 2007,27 the EPA declared in 
December 2007 that it would deny the petition.28 The EPA issued the 
 
 20. Id. § 7543(b)(1). 
 21. Since 1967, when the preemption and preemption waiver provisions were adopted, 
California has submitted and EPA has granted over fifty waivers of preemption in compliance 
with statutory terms. JAMES E. MCCARTHY & ROBERT MELTZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
CALIFORNIA’S WAIVER REQUEST TO CONTROL GREENHOUSE GASES UNDER THE CLEAN AIR 
ACT 2 (2007), available at http://www.azclimatechange.gov/download/082007.pdf. 
 22. Id. 
 23.  Notice of Decision Denying a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s 
Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for New Motor Vehicles, 73 Fed. Reg. 12,156, 12,157 
(Mar. 6, 2008). 
 24. See 42 U.S.C. § 7507. 
 25. See Pew Center on Global Climate Change, Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Standards, http://www.pewclimate.org/what_s_being_done/in_the_states/vehicle_ghg_standard. 
cfm (last visited May 31, 2008). 
 26. The EPA initially took the position that decision on the waiver petition would be 
inappropriate prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct 1438 
(2007). Notice of Decision Denying a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s 
Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for New Motor Vehicles, 73 Fed. Reg. at 12,157. In 
Massachusetts, the EPA argued that greenhouse gases were not “air pollutants” within the 
meaning of the Clean Air Act. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct., at 1450. In April 2007, the Supreme 
Court rejected the EPA’s arguments. See id. 1462. 
 27. Notice of Decision Denying a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s 
Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for New Motor Vehicles, 73 Fed. Reg. at 12,157. 
 28. Id. 
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supporting opinion in February 2008, and it was published in the 
Federal Register on March 6, 2008.29 
That decision is notable because, to carry out its statutory 
responsibility to decide the petition, the EPA had to offer an 
interpretation of the scope of Section 209(b)(1)(B) of the Clean Air 
Act. That section says that no waiver can be granted “if the 
Administrator finds . . . that such State does not need such State 
standards to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions.”30 The 
EPA construed this waiver exception to mean that the California 
standards at issue must be aimed at addressing a distinctively local 
problem.31 Otherwise, the EPA reasoned, the waiver must be denied 
and the California standards preempted by federal law.32 The EPA 
then applied the standard and found that the California standards did 
not meet the requirement because greenhouse gases represent global 
causes of a global problem of warming.33 Even if warming might 
worsen California’s local air pollution problems, the agency reasoned, 
greenhouse gases causing that warming might come from anywhere 
and so must be addressed through a national approach, rather than 
locally.34 
Whatever answer the agency might have offered to the 
interpretive question, a thorough examination of it raises all the sorts 
of issues Professors Galle and Seidenfeld would predict. One would 
expect an expert interpreter of the scope of the waiver provisions to 
consider not only congressional intent reflected in the language, but 
also purposive issues. These would include the statutory goal of 
protecting air quality; concern with the cost of implementing multiple 
standards; and the value of some state regulatory autonomy to 
address local concerns, to experiment with policy, and to 
counterbalance federal authority.35 
Professors Galle and Seidenfeld suggest that normally this is the 
sort of job an agency should be able to undertake: “[A]gencies are 
well suited for evaluating the benefits of both localism and the need 
 
 29. See id. at 12,156–57. 
 30. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1)(B) (2000). 
 31. Notice of Decision Denying a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s 
Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for New Motor Vehicles, 73 Fed. Reg. at 12,160. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See id. at 12,162–63. 
 35. See Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, supra note 3, at 756–57 (summarizing 
federalism concerns that might be supported by a presumption against preemption). 
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for experimentation within the programs they regulate . . . [including] 
the extent of problems with all existing regulatory paradigms that 
might warrant using states as laboratories to develop new 
approaches.”36 
One might see the California waiver as a sort of test case for 
their arguments. Given the existing controversies about how to 
regulate climate change, coupled with California’s past leadership on 
automotive air emissions, this is the sort of case in which an agency 
ought to be well suited at least to consider (if not ultimately to place 
dispositive weight upon) the “problems with . . . existing regulatory 
paradigms” and thus the value of state policy experimentation. 
Moreover, four features of the California waiver decision process 
make it a particularly good test case for Professors Galle and 
Seidenfeld’s views. Because of the formal procedural advantages of 
rulemaking, Galle and Seidenfeld would like to see agencies take 
positions on preemption through rulemaking.37 Admittedly, the 
decision on California’s waiver petition is not a “rule” and thus was 
not made through “rulemaking.” Nonetheless, in nearly all relevant 
procedural respects, the decision resembled a rulemaking, and a 
highly visible one at that. 
First, the EPA held public hearings,38 as required by statute,39 
and, as with rulemaking, conducted a notice and comment process.40 
As Administrator Stephen Johnson explained in his decision letter to 
Governor Schwarzenegger, 
As you know, EPA undertook an extensive public notice and 
comment process with regard to the waiver request. The Agency 
held two public hearings: one on May 22, 2007 in Washington, D.C. 
and one in Sacramento, California on May 30, 2007. We heard from 
over 80 individuals at these hearings and received thousands of 
written comments during the ensuing public comment process from 
parties representing a broad set of interests, including state and local 
 
 36. Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 1977. 
 37. See id. at 2011 (“This suggests that the agency should displace state law only by clearly 
stated legislative rules.”). 
 38. Notice of Decision Denying a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s 
Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for New Motor Vehicles, 73 Fed. Reg. at 12,157. 
 39. See 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1) (2000) (requiring “notice and opportunity for public 
hearing” prior to decision on a waiver application). 
 40. Notice of Decision Denying a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s 
Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for New Motor Vehicles, 73 Fed. Reg. at 12,157. This, and 
other procedural requirements for rulemaking, are detailed in 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006). 
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governments, public health and environmental organizations, 
academia, industry and citizens. The Agency also received and 
considered a substantial amount of technical and scientific material 
submitted after the close of the comment deadline on June 15, 
2007.41 
Second, the EPA’s decision is subject to judicial review, as a rule 
would be, under the arbitrary and capricious standard.42 Third, though 
Office of Management and Budget clearance was not required for this 
decision,43 EPA officials reportedly consulted with the White House 
on the decision anyway.44 Fourth, given the amount of press coverage 
and congressional attention given to the December 2007 
announcement of denial,45 not to mention California’s immediate 
filing of a lawsuit challenging the denial,46 the EPA could reasonably 
 
 41. Letter from Stephen Johnson, EPA Administrator, to Arnold Schwarzenegger, 
Governor of Cal. (Dec. 19, 2007), available at http://www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/20071219-slj.pdf. 
 42. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (stating that judicial review standards for agency action 
include review to confirm that the action is not “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with law”). One requirement applicable to rulemaking would not 
seem to apply here: an obligation to respond to “significant comments” that courts have 
imposed as a gloss on Section 553 of the APA. E.g., United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. 
Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 249–50 (2d Cir. 1977) (“We think that to sanction silence in the face of such 
vital questions [raised in the comments] would be to make the statutory requirement of a 
“concise general statement” less than an adequate safeguard against arbitrary decision-
making.); Am. Mining Cong. v. EPA, 965 F.2d 759, 771 (9th Cir. 1992). Nonetheless, the other 
environmental features of the decision should have given EPA ample incentive to engage all 
relevant arguments. 
 43. See Exec. Order No. 13,422, 72 Fed Reg. 2,763 (Jan. 18, 2007); Exec. Order No. 12,866, 
3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006) (requiring Office of Management and 
Budget clearance only of agency rules). 
 44. A March 2008 Senate appropriations committee hearing transcript contained the 
following colloquy between California Senator Dianne Feinstein and EPA Administrator 
Stephen Johnson: 
FEINSTEIN: Did you discuss it with the White House? 
JOHNSON: As I have said in previous testimonies, yes, I discuss major issues with 
the White House. I think that’s good government. I discussed it with my colleagues 
across the administration. But again, the decision, the final decision rests with me and 
I made the decision . . . . 
Fiscal Year 2009 Budget for the EPA: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Interior, Environmental, 
and Related Agencies of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 110th Cong. (Mar. 4, 2008), 2008 WL 
607187. 
 45. E.g., John M. Broder & Felicity Barringer, E.P.A. Says 17 States Can’t Set Emission 
Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/20/washington/20epa. 
html?_r=1&oref=slogin; Alex Kaplun, Senate Panel to Probe Decision on Calif. Waiver, 
GREENWIRE, Dec. 21, 2007 (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 46. See Alex Kaplun, Calif., Groups Sue EPA Over Waiver Decision, GREENWIRE, Jan. 2, 
2008 (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
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expect a high degree of public accountability. The EPA could 
anticipate that the opinion explaining the denial would slip beneath 
no one’s radar screen. And indeed, immediately after the EPA issued 
the opinion supporting the waiver denial, EPA Administrator 
Johnson was questioned in Congress regarding the decision.47 
Despite these seemingly optimal conditions for deliberation, the 
EPA’s consideration of abstract federalism concerns was inadequate. 
The EPA interpreted the statute to require preemption of California 
standards unless the standards address “compelling and 
extraordinary” local air pollution conditions, in which the causes, too, 
are “local to California.”48 
Again, my focus here is not on the result, but on the analysis the 
EPA used to get there. The EPA’s opinion largely focused on what it 
believed Congress intended in enacting the words “compelling and 
extraordinary.”49 The Administrator’s opinion stated in relevant part, 
I believe that . . . . Section 209(b) was a compromise measure that 
allowed disruption of the introduction of new motor vehicles into 
interstate commerce by allowing California to have its own motor 
vehicle program, but limited this to situations where the air 
pollution problems have their basic cause, and therefore their 
solution, locally in California.50 
Interestingly, the EPA opinion contained no discussion of the 
practical implications of its interpretation, either for automobile 
manufacturers or for the environment. Instead, it reads primarily as 
an exercise in pure statutory interpretation. 
In that vein, even in a case that very clearly raised the value of 
state experimentation given California’s history of regulating air 
pollution, the EPA did not discuss this core federalism value. The 
opinion did not consider the value of permitting California to 
continue to serve as a “laboratory” in developing climate change 
policies. Discussing this issue would have been appropriate in light of 
 
 47. Administrator Johnson was questioned in appropriations hearings, as well as in other 
settings. E.g., Fiscal Year 2009 Budget for the EPA, supra note 44; Fiscal Year 2009 Budget for 
the EPA: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Interior, Environmental, and Related Agencies of the 
S. Comm. on Appropriations, 110th Cong. (Feb. 26, 2008), 2008 WL 526941. 
 48. See Notice of Decision Denying a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s 
Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for New Motor Vehicles, 73 Fed. Reg. 12,156, 12,163 
(Mar. 6, 2008). 
 49. See id. 
 50. Id.; see also id. (discussing “the unique problems faced in California as a result of its 
climate and topography” (citing H.R. REP. NO. 90-728, at 21 (1967)). 
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the statute’s silence on whether “compelling and extraordinary” 
issues were to be local, in light of the legislative history, and, for that 
matter, in light of the arguments made to the EPA.51 
To be fair, the EPA’s analysis did consider the value of 
California’s ability to respond to local concerns.52 In that respect, it is 
something of an improvement over other agency preemption 
decisions. For example, the opinion explicitly considered the value of 
California being able to address its distinctively local air pollution 
problems.53 
The EPA’s failure, however, to consider the value of state policy 
experimentation in this best case scenario is consistent with my earlier 
documentation of agency failure to consider these values. In Chevron 
and Preemption, I have documented agency failures to comply with 
the “federalism impact statement” requirements of Executive Order 
13,132.54 In A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, I updated this 
research and also examined several examples of agency preemption 
declarations.55 The EPA’s failure in the California greenhouse gas 
waiver denial to thoroughly examine what Professors Galle and 
Seidenfeld term “abstract federalism”56 issues is typical of past agency 
interpretations. I argued in those articles that this failure is largely a 
function of lack of agency expertise.57 
I agree with Professors Galle and Seidenfeld, however, that the 
analysis cannot simply be a critique of agency capabilities without 
 
 51. The EPA opinion did, a few pages earlier, note that “part of [the] benefit” to California 
of the 209(b) waiver was to allow the state to serve as a “laboratory for potential federal motor 
vehicle controls.” Id. at 12,162. In simply mentioning this issue, the EPA opinion represents a 
substantial advance over most other agency actions relating to the extent of state law 
preemption. See, e.g., Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, supra note 3, at 784 (describing 
other examples of agency preemption discussions); Mendelson, Presumption, supra note 3, at 
718–32 & nn 122–30. It may be that agencies will eventually develop some consistent expertise 
on these questions. For this potential to be fully realized, however, legislation is required. See 
infra text accompanying note 81 (arguing that statutory criteria are required to guide both 
agencies and reviewing judges). Ultimately, however, this issue appeared to play no role 
whatsoever in the EPA’s reasoning. Indeed, that sentence could have been omitted from the 
opinion, while making no difference at all either to the analysis or to the outcome. 
 52. Notice of Decision Denying a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s 
Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for New Motor Vehicles, 73 Fed. Reg. 12,159–60. 
 53. Id. at 12,162. 
 54. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, supra note 3, at 783–86. 
 55. Mendelson, Presumption, supra note 3, at 719–21. 
 56. Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 2012. 
 57. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, supra note 3, at 780–82; Mendelson, 
Presumption, supra note 3, at 718. 
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considering how agencies stack up against other institutions. I have 
elsewhere considered, in more general terms, judicial expertise on 
federalism concerns.58 
And how does the EPA’s discussion on this issue of “abstract 
federalism” compare with that of Congress? In a word, poorly. When 
Congress enacted the Air Quality Act of 1967, including Section 209 
of the Clean Air Act, both House and Senate committee reports 
discussing the question of preemption considered the value of 
uniform national standards in addition to California’s need to 
respond to local conditions, its status as a leader in regulating air 
pollution, and the value to the country of California’s “policy 
experiments.” The House Report, for example, contained discussion 
of the need for uniformity: “The ability of those engaged in the 
manufacture of automobiles to obtain clear and consistent answers 
concerning emission controls and standards is of considerable 
importance so as to permit economies in production.”59 It also 
considered “the unique problems facing California as a result of its 
climate and topography,”60 and the value to the entire country of the 
state’s leadership and its service as a model for regulating air 
pollution.61 Similarly, the Senate Committee Report focused on 
California’s “unique problems and pioneering efforts,” and stated, 
The Nation will have the benefit of California’s experience with 
lower standards which will require new control systems and design. 
In fact California will continue to be the testing area for such lower 
standards. . . [and if successful] it is expected that the Secretary 
will . . . give serious consideration to strengthening the Federal 
standards.62  
Both committees discussed these federalism issues although they 
arrived at different conclusions. The Senate committee adopted a 
version of the preemption provisions closer to their current form—
allowing California to draft the standards, subject to an EPA waiver 
determination.63 The House committee, however, reported a bill with 
 
 58. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, supra note 3, at 787–88. 
 59. H.R. REP. NO. 90-728, at 21 (1967). 
 60. Id. at 22. 
 61. Id. at 96 (separate statement Mssrs. John E. Moss & Lionel Van Deerlin) (“California 
has led the Nation in promulgating strict emission control requirements . . . .”); id. (“California 
has been a model for the Nation in this critical field.”). 
 62. S. REP. NO. 90-403, at 33 (1967). 
 63. See id. 
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no role preserved for California—instead, the bill authorized the 
federal government to set special standards for California.64 
In 1977, similar strains appeared in congressional discussions on 
amendments to the Clean Air Act. The House Report explained 
Section 209 with reference both to local issues and California’s service 
as an example to the rest of the country: “California was afforded 
special status due to that State’s pioneering role in regulating 
automobile-related emissions, which pre-dated the Federal effort. In 
addition, California’s air pollution problem was then, and still appears 
to be, among the most pervasive and acute in the Nation.”65 
In oversight hearings in 2007 and 2008, discussion among 
members of Congress has included consideration of these abstract 
federalism issues. In March 2008, during EPA budget hearings in the 
Senate, for example, a number of Senators commented on the states’ 
rights issues raised by the EPA’s treatment of the California waiver 
petition.66 In House of Representatives hearings in November 2007 
and February 2008, members of Congress mentioned the value of 
states as “laboratories of democracy, the places where innovative 
solutions to the nation’s challenges are developed,”67 as well as 
expressing concern with the EPA stopping states from leading the 
nation on difficult policy questions.68 In January 2008 Senate hearings 
on climate change policy, in questioning a top administration official 
on its climate change policies compared with those of the states, 
another Senator observed the value of the “whole concept of 
 
 64. H.R. REP. NO. 90-728, at 9. 
 65. H.R. REP. NO. 95-294, at 301 (1977). 
 66. See Fiscal Year 2009 Budget for the EPA: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Interior, 
Environmental, and Related Agencies of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 110th Cong. (2008), 
2008 WL 607187 (statement of Sen. Allard) (“I do not necessarily agree on all aspects of the 
greenhouse debate, but . . . . I’m also troubled by the suggestion that the state of California’s 
rights may have been curtailed.”); id. (statement of Sen. Feinstein) (“I mean, it seems to me if 
Congress intended for waivers to be limited to problems unique to California, why did it give 
other states the right to adopt the same standards?”). 
 67. State Efforts Toward Low-Carbon Energy: Hearing Before the H. Select Comm. on 
Energy Independence and Global Warming, 110th Cong. (2007), 2007 WL 3389741 (statement of 
Rep. Markey); see also id. (statement of Rep. McCollum) (“We have California, Wyoming, 
Washington, and the northern states coming up with creative ideas.”). 
 68. Hearing on the EPA Before the Subcomm. on Interior, Environmental, and Related 
Agencies of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 110th Cong. (2008), 2008 WL 526941 (statement 
of Rep. Moran) (“I was stunned that—where I would think that EPA would be encouraging 
state and local efforts. You pulled the rug out from under California, which was attempting to 
show the lead, because of the lack of leadership on the federal government’s part.”). 
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federalism. We can learn in the [process] of doing.”69 In short, 
congressional deliberations on state law preemption seem clearly 
superior to those of the EPA, despite the advantages of procedural 
rigor and greater transparency Professors Galle and Seidenfeld would 
claim for the agency. 
So, why did the EPA not do a better job? It is impossible to 
know for sure, but procedural irregularities can be ruled out given the 
extensive process that accompanied the decision. Similarly, lack of 
political accountability likely also can be ruled out given the apparent 
(though informal) White House involvement.70 For purposes of this 
discussion, I also assume the agency was not captured by rent-seeking 
interest groups or otherwise malfunctioning dramatically. Although a 
contrary assumption could, in theory, explain the outcome, there is 
little reason to think it would explain the quality of analysis. 71 
I suggest two possible explanations for the agency’s 
impoverished exploration of abstract federalism issues. First, as I 
have argued in greater detail elsewhere, assessing the abstract issues 
implicated in the distribution of federal and state power is not 
typically within the core expertise of a federal regulatory agency.72 
The EPA is a specialized institution focused, in the setting of the 
Clean Air Act, on how best to protect health and the environment by 
regulating air pollution. Implementing that act only raises some of the 
many questions relevant to preemption, such as interstate issues and 
the burdens upon regulated entities that must comply with multiple 
standards. Congress has given the agency no specific guidance on how 
to interpret Clean Air Act preemption language. As the EPA itself 
notes, past waiver decisions have been far more cursory in analyzing 
the scope of this statutory language.73 
 
 69 Climate Change: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 110th Cong. (2008) 
(statement of Sen. Cardin), 2008 WL 219099. 
 70 See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 71 Capture could, of course, explain the result here. I have elsewhere argued that if one 
accepts a public choice view of agency regulation, state law preemption can allow an agency to 
more effectively “deliver on ‘deals’ with well-organized interest groups.” Mendelson, Chevron 
and Preemption, supra note 3, at 795. 
 72 See id. at 779-91. 
 73 See Notice of Decision Denying a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s 
Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for New Motor Vehicles, 73 Fed. Reg. 12,156, 12,159 
(Mar. 6, 2008) (“EPA’s review of this criterion has typically been cursory due to California 
needing its motor vehicle emission program due to fundamental factors leading to local and 
regional air pollution problems (as discussed below).”). For an example of the EPA’s cursory 
review, see California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards; Waiver of Federal 
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Further, job postings at the EPA as of this writing, for program 
analysts and senior program officials, seek candidates with expertise 
in relevant environmental laws rather than on broader issues of 
governmental structure.74 Even an EPA posting for a Congressional 
Liaison Specialist in the Office of Congressional and 
Intergovernmental Relations (EPA’s point of contact for Congress 
and state and local governments) mentions only skills working with 
congressional staff, rather than, say, knowledge of state-federal 
relations or general governmental structure.75 The job postings are 
only suggestive, but they indicate that the agency’s focus is far more 
on its specialized mission than on broader issues of the distribution of 
power among different levels of the government. 
Second, an agency may face particular disincentives to thorough 
consideration of abstract federalism values. Fully engaging a primary 
abstract value of federalism—the value of states serving as 
“laboratories of democracy”76—requires an agency to acknowledge, 
either implicitly or explicitly, that its own decision and 
implementation plans may be incomplete, flawed, or at best not fully 
informed. Professors Galle and Seidenfeld argue that agencies are 
aware of “problems with all existing regulatory paradigms.”77 This 
could presumably include shortcomings in federal standards or their 
prospects for implementation. 
Others have commented, however, on an agency’s tendency not 
to thoroughly revisit a proposal which it has developed in a notice of 
 
Preemption—Notice of Waiver Decision and Within the Scope Determinations, 64 Fed. Reg. 
42,689, 42,690 (Aug. 5, 1999) (“CARB has continually demonstrated the existence of compelling 
and extraordinary conditions justifying the need for its own motor vehicle pollution control 
program, which includes the subject standards and procedures. No information has been 
submitted to demonstrate that California no longer has [such] a compelling and extraordinary 
need . . . .”). 
 74. E.g., USAJobs, EPA Supervisory Environmental Program Analyst posting, 
http://jobsearch.usajobs.opm.gov/getjob.asp?JobID=71190618@brd=387...rt=rv&vw=b&Logo=0
&FedPub=Y&lid=316&FedEmp=N&ss=0&TabNum=3&rc= (last visited May 31, 2008) (copy 
on file with author). 
 75. The posting does not mention knowledge of state-federal relations or general 
governmental structure. 
 76. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its 
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without 
risk to the rest of the country.”). 
 77. Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 1977. 
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proposed rulemaking.78 Similarly, an agency’s failure to fully value 
alternative regulatory strategies does not seem all that surprising if 
the agency has already committed to a different policy approach. 
For example, in his letter to Governor Schwarzenegger 
announcing the waiver denial, Administrator Johnson stresses not 
only the statutory grounds for the waiver denial, but also the 
substantive content of the preferred national policy: 
Congress has recognized the need for very aggressive yet technical 
feasible national standards to address greenhouse gases and energy 
security by passing the Energy Independence and Security Act. Just 
today the President signed these national standards into law, 
providing environmental benefits and economic certainty for 
Californians and all Americans. I strongly support this national 
approach . . . .79 
Conceivably, discussing California’s pioneering efforts in 
developing strict greenhouse gas automotive emissions standards 
might have required some implicit acknowledgment from EPA that 
the proposed national solution to global warming might be 
incomplete or inadequate. 
Professors Galle and Seidenfeld suggest that enhanced judicial 
review might help prompt agencies to more fully consider these 
abstract federalism concerns.80 In my view, however, such enhanced 
judicial review cannot take place without Congress enacting a statute 
that guides agencies on when to interpret statutes to preempt state 
law and that thus gives courts criteria with which to review agency 
interpretations. Despite Galle and Seidenfeld’s arguments, judges are 
highly unlikely simply to import into a “hard look” analysis factors 
that are not anchored in an authorizing statute itself. They typically 
look to the underlying statute as the source of the relevant factors 
that an agency must examine.81 Galle and Seidenfeld also mention 
 
 78. E.g., Stephanie Stern, Cognitive Consistency: Theory Maintenance and Administrative 
Rulemaking, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 589, 591 (2002) (“After agency members have devoted months, 
or even years, to preparing a proposed rule and made highly visible public commitments 
endorsing that proposal, the attitude maintenance bias suggests suboptimal processing of later 
public inputs.”). 
 79. Letter from Stephen Johnson, EPA Administrator, to Arnold Schwarzenegger, 
Governor of Cal., supra note 41, at 1–2. 
 80. Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 2012–13. 
 81. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 471 n.4 (2001) (refusing 
to allow an agency to consider cost when the statute did not mention it). See generally 
Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, supra note 3, at 793–94. 
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Executive Order 13,132 on federalism as a possible source of relevant 
values.82 That executive order, however, is explicitly unenforceable; 
noncompliance with it thus cannot serve as the basis for judicial 
review of an agency action.83 Congressional action is clearly required 
here. Further, rather than prompting better consideration of 
federalism issues, current judicial review of agency action may 
actually serve to deter agencies from fully considering them. An 
agency that chooses a particular implementation path must defend its 
decision as fully reasoned to survive “hard look review.”84 
Acknowledging that states may have something significant and 
valuable to add to regulatory approaches, however, is not altogether 
consistent with an agency fully defending its own decision as the best 
option. Under some circumstances, fully valuing state approaches 
might undermine the agency’s position that its decision is well 
reasoned. An agency could, in theory, value states as “laboratories,” 
while still defending its own (perhaps preliminary) choice as well 
reasoned. Nonetheless, an agency is not likely to favor such a 
strategy. When an agency is required to consider alternatives to a 
particular decision, such as under the National Environment Policy 
Act or other statutes, the information on alternatives the agency has 
developed arguably can prompt more litigation on whether the 
agency has fully considered an alternative or made the right choice.85 
Though agencies do generally win these lawsuits, the prospect of 
more litigation may discourage an agency from meaningfully 
considering the value of divergent state policy alternatives. 
The incentive from judicial review, of course, does not apply to 
Congress. Professors Galle and Seidenfeld argue that Congress, too, 
 
 82. See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 1983 n.2ll. 
 83. Exec. Order No. 13,132 § 11, 3 C.F.R. 206, 211 (2000), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 
(2006). 
 84. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 
(1983) (applying arbitrary and capricious standard to require agency to provide reasoned 
analysis of policy choice). 
 85. See, e.g., Nevada Land Action Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Service, 8 F.3d 713 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(denying a challenge to agency action for failure to justify chosen land management alternative 
in comparison to others considered); Md. Wildlife Fed’n v. Dole, 747 F.2d 229 (4th Cir. 1984) 
(dismissing a challenge to failure to adequately consider highway alternatives under NEPA), 
vacated sub. nom, Md. Wildlife Fed’n v. Lewis, 22 ERC 1910 (4th Cir. 1985) (No. 83-1429); 
United States v. Bell Petroleum Servs., 734 F. Supp. 771 (W.D. Tex. 1990) (ruling on a challenge 
to agency’s decision to install a drinking water system, rather than taking no action or supplying 
bottled water under CERCLA); see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. 29 (applying 
arbitrary and capricious standard to require agency to provide a reasoned analysis of its policy 
choice). 
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faces some unique disincentives to fully considering state interests. 
Citing my work, they argue that “[s]tate lobbying in favor of general 
state prerogatives typically is weak as a result of free rider effects.”86 
To clarify matters somewhat, lobbying of this sort is more often 
undertaken by the multiple organizations that represent states as a 
whole. These include national organizations such as the National 
Governors’ Association or the National Conference of State 
Legislatures.87 Contrary to Galle and Seidenfeld’s suggestion, these 
organizations thus are likely to fully value general state prerogatives. 
As I have argued in earlier work, however, an individual state 
congressional delegation may not fully value broader federalism 
interests such as the value of experimentation, because those values 
accrue to the nation as a whole, not only to the state the delegation 
represents. On the other hand, individual state delegations in 
Congress may have a particular interest in valuing local interests—for 
example, the Michigan delegation is known for voting against 
measures that would harm the automobile industry and local 
employment. This may devolve into the pathology of trying to export 
costs of a regulatory scheme from one region to another.88 (For 
example, one could imagine the California delegation pressing for 
improved fuel efficiency standards, conceivably disproportionately 
impacting Michigan, but perhaps resisting sizeable fuel tax increases.) 
And indeed, I have argued that if incentives created by political 
structure are important, the EPA, as an executive branch agency that 
reports to the nationally elected chief executive, may be in a better 
position than Congress to fully appreciate federalism benefits that 
accrue nationally.89 
What the California waiver example suggests, however, is that 
despite Congress’s fewer procedural demands and the mixed political 
incentives to fully consider state autonomy, the EPA faces unique 
 
 86. Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 1965. 
 87. For example, the National Conference of State Legislatures maintains the “Preemption 
Monitor” webpage. Law and Criminal Justice, Preemption Monitor, http://www. 
ncsl.org/standcomm/sclaw/PreemptionMonitor_Index.htm (last visited May 31, 2008); see also 
Nat’l Governors Ass’n, Importance of Federalism, http://www.nga.org/portal/site/nga/menuitem. 
5cd31a89efe1f1e122d81fa6501010a0/?vgnextoid=817486c0f1c61010VgnVCM1000001a01010aRC
RD (last visited May 31, 2008). 
 88. See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 1966; Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against 
Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1, 26–27 (2007). 
 89. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, supra note 3, at 769–73. 
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constraints that may undermine its ability to fully consider 
“federalism values” in its discussions on preemption. 
If Congress were to provide agencies with clear guidance about 
how to evaluate preemption claims, that might prompt greater 
development of institutional competence on these federalism values. 
Such legislation also might provide more guidance for courts 
reviewing agency interpretations for consistency with the law and 
under the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard. That might 
facilitate greater accountability of the sort Professors Galle and 
Seidenfeld envision. 
Absent such legislative action, however, what is the best 
approach? Courts should not afford Chevron deference to agency 
preemption interpretations. At most, the interpretations should 
receive Skidmore deference—granted if the court finds the agency 
interpretation “persuasive.” Under Skidmore, a court evaluating an 
agency interpretation could examine the ‘“thoroughness evident in its 
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier 
and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power 
to persuade, if lacking power to control.’”90 Such an approach would 
allow a court to pay heed to an agency’s relevant expertise, such as on 
the difficulty of complying with multiple standards or the extent to 
which state law might undermine an important federal goal. At the 
same time, it would permit a court to disregard an agency’s 
conclusions if, for example, it failed to take important federalism 
issues into account in a preemption decision. If an agency’s 
interpretation is completely unpersuasive and thus receives little 
deference from a reviewing court, the court thus will rely primarily on 
its own reading of the statutory language. Congress can respond to 
the court’s reading of the language with clarification or greater 
specificity. Professors Galle and Seidenfeld worry that a judicial 
mistake on preemption may be difficult to correct because of the 
obstacles to enacting legislation.91 It is worth noting, however, that if 
the administrative agency disagrees with the judicial reading, the 
agency can join other interested parties in seeking a statutory 
amendment. This is likely to be a powerful combination. 
 
 90. Id. at 797–98 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)). 
 91. See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 1984. 
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CONCLUSION 
Professors Galle and Seidenfeld are surely correct that neither an 
administrative agency nor Congress faces a perfect set of political 
incentives to fully consider the values of state autonomy. They fail to 
recognize, however, distinct limitations on agency capacity to 
examine state law preemption questions. The California waiver case 
study suggests that despite an advantageous procedural setting, an 
agency’s deliberation on preemption still may be impaired by a 
relative lack of expertise and the need for the agency to justify its own 
preferred policy. An agency thus may not adequately consider 
important federalism values. In sum, Congress and the judiciary 
currently appear to be more promising places in which to locate 
difficult questions of state law preemption. 
 
